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THE BARGAIN HAS BEEN STRUCK:
CASE FOR PLEA BARGAINING IN INDIA
Sonan Kathuria*

Under the traditionalmodel of criminal adjudication,an impartial
adjudicator, after a formal adversarialtrial, determines guilt and
imposes a penalty appropriatefor the offender from the range
prescribed by legislation. This note discusses a deviation from this
model now available under the Indian system, commonly known as
"plea bargaining." The author concludes that the model of plea
bargaining introduced into the Criminal Procedure Code both
reasonable and legaL
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1. INTRODUCTION
In its most conventional and general sense, plea bargaining refers to pretrial' negotiations between the prosecution and the defence during which the
accused agrees to plead guilty in return for certain concessions promised by the

III Year, B.A. LL.B. (Hons.), National Law School of India University, Bangalore.
At the plea stage the accused is informed of the charges against him who then has to
plead guilty or not guilty to it, after which issues to be tried by the court are
formulated.
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prosecutor: usually to drop or reduce some charges,' or to recommend a specific
sentence or to refrain from making any sentence recommendationA Since
ultimately both affect the dispositional phase of the criminal proceedings by
affecting the sentence, plea bargaining in this note will be taken to imply the
waiver of the right to a trial in exchange for reduction in sentence.4
Plea bargaining is widely resorted to in the United States of America, so
much so that ninety to ninety five percent of the criminal cases end with negotiated
agreements rather then courtroom trials.5 By virtue of the Criminal Law
(Amendment) Act, 2005, plea bargaining has been introduced in India by way of
insertion of Chapter XXI A into the Criminal Procedure Code of 1973 [hereinafter
also referred to as the "Cr.P.C."], which has come into effect from July 5, 2006.
The introduction of plea bargaining in the Indian criminal justice system is
largely a response to the deplorable status quo, reflected in the delay in disposal
of criminal cases and appeals, the huge arrears of cases and the appalling plight of
undertrial prisoners in jails. 6 Critics of the plea bargaining system, however,
allege that the system leads to excessive and undeserved leniency in the sentencing
of admitted criminals, dilutes the deterrent effect of law and is coercive insofar as
it induces the accused either to plead guilty in return for a lighter sentence or to
waive the right to a trial in return for some other advantage. Others simply contend
2

This is often known as "charge bargaining."

3 This is often known as "sentence bargaining."
4 For a detailed explanation on forms of plea bargaining, see W.R. LAFAVE

LT AL., CRIMINAL

PROCEDURB, 766 (1985) [hereinafter LAFAvs].
s

AMmlcAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PROJEcT ON MINIMuM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUsrICE: STANDARDS RELATING
TO PLEAS OF GUILTY 1-2 (New York, 1968); C.H. WHITEBREAD ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN
ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 569 (1986) [hereinafter WHITEBREAD] .

6

Statements of Objects and Reasons, Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2005. The
then Chief Justice of India Y.K Sabharwal has remarked that, "It is expected that
this provision will be utilized sincerely and honestly so as to achieve the desired
result of reduction in arrears and expeditious disposal of the criminal cases. Not only
will it expedite the disposal of the cases, it may also result in adequate compensation
for the victim of the crime, since he along with prosecutor will be in a position to
bargain with the accused." Justice Sobhag Mal Jain Memorial Lecture on Delayed
Justice, delivered by Hon'ble Chief Justice of India, Y.K. Sabharwal, July 25, 2006,
available at http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in/new links/Delayed%2oJustice.pdf
(last visited May 27, 2007). The heavy work load is clear from the staggering
figures. Each judge of the High Court has at least 5,600 cases pending before him.
A. Dwivedi et al., Plea Bargaining in India: Changing Dimensions, Caum. L. J. 13, 15
(2005). According to another estimate, at the end of December 2005, the pendency
at the level of High Courts stood over 35 lakh cases, and at 2.57 crore cases at the

subordinate court level. Justice A.K. Sikri, Reforming Criminal Justice System: Can
Plea Bargaining be the Answer? 1o(i)

NAYA
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that the outcome of a criminal case should not be affected by lack of resources
and that haggling over the "price" of a guilty plea is in principle wrong.7
No doubt efficiency and speedy disposal of cases are important and desirable
goals. The question that is considered in this note is whether they are worth the
perceived costs of plea bargaining. To this end, an attempt is made to examine
whether there is any inherent impropriety in the system of plea negotiation, as
also to understand the Indian avatar of plea bargaining and appraise it in view of
the traditional objections to any system of plea bargaining.

II.

THE INDIAN MODEL OF PLEA BARGAINING

Chapter XXI A of the Cr.P.C. inserted by the Criminal Law (Amendment)
Act of 2005 consists of twelve provisions detailing the plea bargaining scheme.
The provisions, though, are not entirely in sync with the scheme recommended
by the Law Commission of India in its one hundred and forty second and one
hundred and fifty fourth Reports and endorsed by the Malimath Committee." Both
schemes are discussed in turn in this section.
As per the Cr.P.C., the initiative to move the machinery for negotiated pleas
is left to the accused. A person accused of an offence for which the maximum
punishment does not exceed seven years may file an application for plea bargaining

in the court in which such offence is pending for trial.9 This is where the Indian
scheme differs crucially from the American scheme, often considered the prototype, where an application is made by the public prosecutor and the accused after
negotiations between them are over.' On receiving the application, the court has
to examine the accused in camera, and if it is satisfied that the application has
been filed by the accused voluntarily, the victim, the accused, the public prosecutor
and investigating officer, if the case is one instituted on a police report, are given
time to work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case, which may include
the accused giving compensation to the victim and other expenses incurred during
7 See generally, S. Krislov, Debating on Bargaining:Comments from a Synthesizer,

13(2)

LAw & Soc'Y REV. 573 (1979).
8 UNION MrNisr

OF HOMEAFFAIRS, REPORT OF TH

COMMITEE ONREFORMS

OF CRIMINAL JUSrICE SYSTEM

179 (New Delhi, 2003).
9 § 265B(1), Cr.P.C.

Fed. R. Crim. P. W1(e). The long history of plea bargaining in the United States of
America has led to the development of a few essential requirements to be complied
with in order for the process to be held valid under law. These requirements are that
any guilty plea must be made voluntarily and intelligently, and it must be supported
by a factual basis developed on the record. See WHITERrEAD, supra note 5, at 593.
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the case." This is where the second major divergence from the American system
comes in: it is implicit from the provision that the victim has the power to veto the
bargain reached, unlike in the United States where the inability of victims to mount
private prosecutions or to compel public prosecution reinforces the bargaining
power of prosecutors and the limited ability of victims to influence the terms of
plea agreements.1
The judge is not envisaged to be a silent spectator, but has a significant role
to play in the process. The court is responsible for ensuring that the whole process
is carried out with the full and voluntary consent of the accused.3 Where a
satisfactory disposition of the case has been worked out, the court is bound to
dispose of the case after awarding compensation to the victim as per the settlement
arrived at, and after hearing the concerned parties on the issue of quantum of
punishment. It then has to award the sentence, and this may range from onefourth to one-half of the prescribed punishment for that offence. This is similar
to the practice in other common law jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom
and Australia, where plea bargaining is permitted to the limited extent that the
prosecutors and the defence can agree that the defendant will plead guilty to
some charges and the prosecutor will drop the rest, while the courts have reserved
their power to decide always what the appropriate penalty is to be.' 5
The law also makes it mandatory to pronounce the judgment in open court. 6
A clause has been added in favour of the accused stipulating that the statement or
facts stated by an accused in an application for plea bargaining shall not be used
for any other purpose. 7 The judgment delivered by the Court in case of plea
bargaining shall be final and no appeal shall lie in any court against the judgment.
Gertain other provisions also indicate the cautious approach of the
legislature. Section 265A declares that plea bargaining cannot be availed of in
respect of those offences for which punishment is more than an imprisonment of
seven years and/or where the offence affects the socio-economic condition of the
country (to be notified by the Central Government) or has been committed against
" § 265B(4), Cr.P.C.
'2
J.E. R6ss, The EntrenchedPosition ofPlea Bargainingin UnitedStates Legal Practice,54
Am. J. Coup. L. 717, 717 (2006) [hereinafter Ross].
'3
Proviso to § 265C(a), Cr.P.C.
14 § 265E, Cr.P.C.
t6

supra note 6, at 44.
§ 265E, Cr.P.C.
§ 265K, Cr.P.C.

18

§ 265G, Cr.P.C.

15

Sin,
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a woman or a child below the age of fourteen years. The availability of the
procedure is also restricted to first time offenders.9
The scheme described above and incorporated into the Cr.P.C. is,
nonetheless, at divergence with that suggested by the Law Commission of India in
its Reports, which it called "concessional treatment for those who on their own
choose to plead guilty without any bargaining". The scheme envisaged the
constitution of a "competent authority"- a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate
of the First Class specially designated as a "Plea-Judge" by the High Court in case
of offences punishable with imprisonment for less than seven years, and in case of
other offences, two retired judges of the High Court appointed in consultation
with the Chief Justice of the High Court and his two senior most colleagues- to
decide on whether or not to accord concessional treatment to an accused who
makes an application for the same.20 Thus, theoretically, there is no room for
bargaining or underhand dealings with the prosecution or the judge trying the
case. The victim and the prosecutor have a role to play only insofar as they have
a right to be heard and place their points of view before the competent authority.
Quite apparently, the scheme recommended was, thus, only a formalisation of
the practice of showing some leniency in punishment to those who plead guilty,
rather than plea bargaining in its conventional sense.
Plea bargaining is sometimes seen as being akin to compounding of offences
under section 320 of the Cr.P.C. as both involve methods of Alternative Dispute
Resolution (ADR).22 But there are some important differences between the two.
Compounding of an offence has the effect of an acquittal. There is no admission of
guilt which is the starting point for both punitive and rehabilitative rationales for
punishment. Secondly, only offences that are essentially of a private nature have
been recognised by the Cr.P.C. as compoundable, while some others are
compoundable with the permission of the court.2 3 This is because a "crime" is
'9

20

Under § 265B of the Cr.P.C., the trial court is also obligated to reject application for
plea bargaining where it finds that the accused has been previously convicted by a
court in which he was charged with the same offence.
LAw COMMISSION OF INDIA, 142ND REPORT ONCoNcEssIONAL TREATMENT FOR OFFENDERS WHO ON THEIR
OWN INITIATIVE CHOOSE TO PLEAD GUILTY WITHour ANY BARGAINING 24-34 (New Delhi, 1991)
[hereinafter LAw ComMissioN OF INDIA].

21 T. Aggarwal
22

23

et al., Wanna Make a Deal? The Introduction of Plea-Bargainingin India?,

(2006) 2 S.C.C. (Cri) (J) 12, 19 [hereinafter AGGARWAL].
In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Chandrika, A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 164, the Supreme Court
spoke of the concept of compounding of certain offences under § 320, Cr. P.C. as one
of "negotiated settlement in criminal cases". Therefore, it is important to clearly
distinguish it from that of plea bargaining.
RV. KEizAR, LECTUREs ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 209 (2003).
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essentially seen as a wrong against society at large and the state, thereby, acquiring
an interest in criminal punishment, a compromise between the accused and the
victim is generally not allowed. This also explains why an expansion of the list of
compoundable offences under section 320 of the Cr.P.C. could not have been an
answer to the problem of overcrowded dockets and jails for which plea bargaining
was purportedly introduced in India.
The next section undertakes an appraisal of the criticisms generally leveled
against the concept of plea bargaining vis-a-vis the Indian model of the same.

IT1.

TRADITIONAL OBJECTIONS TO PLEA BARGAINING
AND AN APPRAISAL OF THE INDIAN SCHEME

The most common justification for plea bargaining is its utility in disposing
of large number of cases in a prompt, efficient and simple manner. 4 However,
while in the United States this remains a justification and post hoc rationalisation
for the legislative recognition of the antecedent practice of plea bargainings in
India it is also the raison d'dtre for the introduction of the practice. Even then,
the conventional caseload explanation has come to be questioned in the United
States. For example, Milton Heumann, attacks the case-pressure explanation

and suggests an alternative explanation based on courtroom dynamics and
workgroup interactionsa6 Also, while in the United States, a prime reason for
overburdened dockets was the nature of jury trials, the prime reason in India for
delayed disposition of criminal cases is structural, that is, the way the investigating
agencies and courts functionY Whether or not the introduction of plea bargaining
will be successful in relieving the courts of some of their burden is an open question.
Thus, there is a need to look beyond the administrative rationale associated with
ADR practices and examine the objections raised against plea negotiations.
There are three, main arguments against plea bargaining that need to be
considered. The first focuses on procedural fairness for individual defendants:
21

25

LAFAVE, supra note 4, at 767. Members of the judiciary are in favour of plea bargaining
for this very reason, that is, reduction of workload to bring it within manageable
limits. See H.S. Mathani, The Right to Speedy Trial, THE HrwDu, April 24, 2001; SnIu,
supra note 6, at 58.
M. Heumann, A Note on Plea Bargaining and Case Pressure, 9 LAw & Soc'y REv. 515
(1975); M. E. Vogel, The Social Origins of Plea Bargaining:Conflict and the Law in the
Process of State Formation, 1830-1860, 33 LAw & Soc'Y Riv. 161 ( 999).

26 M. HEUMAWN,

PLEA BARGAININGo:

THE ExPERiENCESOs

(1978).
27 AoAwa., supro note 21, at 20.
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that any system of plea bargaining is improper because it places a price on the
exercise of important constitutional rights like the forfeiture of the concessions
available after a guilty plea. The second is that societal interest in rational and
appropriately stringent criminal sentences is compromised on the sole ground of
administrative expediency. The third concern is that the plea negotiation system,
by its very nature, is likely to produce unfair or distorted results. Each is
considered in turn.
A. Punishment and Societal Interest

Proponents of the abolitionist view allege that plea bargaining. seriously
impairs the public interest in effective punishment of crime and accurate separation
of the guilty from the innocent. It weakens the deterrent and incapacitative effect
of law by allowing some accused to escape just desserts?8 Albert Alschuler, for
example, has argued that considerations such as case pressure, efficiency, the
probable outcome of trial neither reflect the purpose of punishment nor the
culpability of the accused.29 The conclusion reached by abolitionists, in effect, is
that the resulting sentences cannot be justified by any rationale for penal sanction,
be it deterrence, societal protection, rehabilitation or even retribution.
The counter-argument in support of plea bargaining runs that by obtaining
guilty pleas, prosecutors can pursue more cases and dispose of cases at a greater
rate, potentially resulting in greater aggregate deterrent or incapacitative effects
with a finite amount of resources.30 Also perhaps, as has been suggested by the
United States Supreme Court, a shortening of the time between the charge and the
disposition enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty?
Moreover, as was argued by the Law Commission, treating an accused who feels
remorse and wants to reform, or is honest enough to plead guilty in the hope that
the state will show some benevolence, at par with an accused being tried at the
cost of time and money of the society, may also not be just and fair.32

8

S.J. Schuihofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979 (1992); D.A. Smith,
The Plea Bargaining Controversy, 77(3) J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 949, 949 (1986)
[hereinafter SMrrn].

,

3o

AW. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 UNIV. CHIcAGo. L. REV. 50,
78 (1968) [hereinafter ALSCHULER, 1968].
F.H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL

STUo.

289, 289-

293 (1983).

(1971). In the words of Chief Justice
Burger, "Disposition of charges after plea discussions...avoids much of the corrosive
impact of enforced idleness during pre-trial confinement of those who are denied
release prior to the trial."
LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, supra note 20, at 8.

3' Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261

32
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Furthermore, while certain accused might appear to reduce their expected
probability of punishment, the safeguard built in the Cr.P.C. is that the accused in
serious cases and offenders with previous criminal histories cannot avail of
concessional treatment by pleading guilty. Moreover, it cannot be denied that a
punishment meted out promptly is likely to better serve the societal purpose
than that meted out after a protracted and ungainly trial.
B. Unfairness of Result
The second major concern expressed is that the disposition of cases would
be influenced by factors extraneous to the correctional needs of the accused or
requirements of law enforcement (such as court workload) so that either of the
following two consequences might occur: offender of a serious crime escapes
with undeserved leniency, or an innocent person is punished.,3
The problem with the argument that the system motivates factually
innocent persons to plead guilty is that it assumes that innocent persons are
necessarily exonerated at trial.3 If most defendants did not face a very real
chance of conviction at trial, all incentive to apply to the court under section
265A would be eliminated and with it this criticism against plea bargaining.
As regards the hazard of factually guilty accused persons eluding the just
dessert, here one must as two questions. First, what is the likelihood of the accused
getting convicted if no bargain had been made? Secondly, is not the assumption
that the accused is factually guilty contradictory to the basic principle of
presumption of innocence?5
It has been suggested that the variation in sentence between accused who
plead guilty and those who are found guilty after trial signifies that one category
is not receiving the appropriate quantum of punishment.36 An adequate response

to this suggestion is that punishment is generally never believed to be precise; the
discount might be acceptable if it remains within the limits of punishments
customarily imposed for the particular type of crime.3" Moreover, the Indian
scheme provides that the sentence discount cannot exceed one-fourth of the
SIAFAVE, supra note 4, at 768.
34 See also, T.W. Church, In Defense of 'Bargain Justice', 13(2) LAw & Soc'y REv. 509, 516
(1979) [hereinafter Cuiouen].
3 See CHURCH, id. The author draws a distinction between factual innocence and legal
innocence.
6 K. Kipnis, Criminal Justice and the Negotiated Plea, 86 ETHIs 93, 98 (1976).
3 JY.M. Hyman, Philosophical Implications of Plea Bargaining: Some Comments, 13(2)
LAw & Soc'y Rev. 565, 581 (1979).
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maximum punishment prescribed.3 Also, by exempting socio-economic offences
and offences which carry punishment of more than seven years imprisonment, it
ensures that the nature of the plea does not outweigh the seriousness of the crime.
The Parliament has also attempted to build into the law a safeguard against
inducement or threat. This safeguard takes the form of active judicial participation
in the process. The judge's role is to promote fairness of the proceedings and to
ensure that the plea is taken voluntarily and after informed consideration,39 and
also to determine the sentence finally.40 If there is no primafacie material spelling
out the offence the applicant is charged with, it is arguable that the judge can, at
his discretion reject the application of the accused on the ground that it indicates
prosecutorial coercion or pressure. The judge can also reject the application of a
guilty person escaping with unduly lenient punishment inasmuch as the court
alone would decide the appropriate punishment in the circumstances of the case,
and as the aggrieved party will get a chance to be heard before the court passes an
order as to punishment. Judicial participation in plea negotiation will help
minimise the danger of sentencing irrationalities by ensuring that granting of
concessions in return of a plea of guilty is limited to legally relevant factors and
not factors like wealth, sex, age, education, etc., and also that interests of the
society and desires of the victim are not absolutely ignored4'
At this stage, it is also pertinent to draw attention to the plea bargaining

model suggested by the Law Commission Reports. Under the scheme envisaged
by the Law Commission, the sole arbiter of an application for pleading guilty in
return of a concession was an independent, specially designated judicial authority
instead of the trial judge as under the present statutory scheme. This provision
should have been incorporated into the Cr.P.C., so as to prevent any perceived or
actual violence to the accused's right to a fair trial.
Even assuming that judicial involvement may not be a foolproof device,
the solution then is not to abolish plea bargaining but to ensure adequate
safeguards, empowering the weaker party, and incorporating reforms as and when
the need arises.
How such a restriction on prosecutorial discretion acts to preclude factually innocent
accused from pleading guilty is examined well in Note, Restructuring the Plea Bargain,
82(2) YALE L. J. 286 (1972)[hereinafter Restructuring the Plea Bargain] and O.G.
Ayal et al., Plea BargainsOnly for the Guilty, 49 J.L & EcoN. 353 (20o6).
39 § 256C, CrPC. See also, Note, Plea Bargainingand the Transformationof the Criminal
Process, 90(3) HAR. L. REV. 564, 584-586 (1977); Note, JudicialParticipationin Guilty
Pleas-A Search for Standards, 33 U. Pr. L. REV. 151, 156 (1971).
§ 265E, Cr.P.C.
§"
38

41

Restructuring the Plea Bargain, supra note 38, at 287-99.
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C. Procedural Fairness and the Defendant

The severest of the critics attack the supposed coerciveness of the process. 42
Plea bargaining is characterised as a series of threats and promises by legal officials
that induce defendants to forfeit many of their constitutional rights and plead
guilty43 On similar lines, it is also criticised as being antagonistic to due process

and making a mockery of the criminal process. It is argued that the dual sentencing
structure penalises defendants for exercising constitutionally guaranteed legal
rights, and renders due process concerns subordinate to procedural
convenience.44 Critics are sometimes skeptical of the procedure because of the
alleged prosecutorial overreaching and overcharging it invites.45
In this context, some scholars in support of negotiated pleas argue that
statutory penalties are often too harsh, and that tailoring punishment through
charge or sentence adjustments makes the criminal justice system more
responsive to the exigencies of individual cases. 46
Concerns about the alleged coerciveness of the process the lack of any
rules of evidence in plea negotiation,47 overlook the fact, documented by published
studies of plea bargaining in other jurisdictions, that the primary determinant of
a guilty plea is the assessment of the probable outcome of a trialA*As was explained
earlier, any negotiation will necessarily happen "in the shadow of the trial"49 The
simple point is that criminal trials produce one "winner" and one "loser." As the
uncertainty of this result swells, so does the incentive for both sides to find some
mutually satisfactory accommodation in which the benefits of success at trial are
discounted by the possibility of failure50
42

4

See, e.g., A.W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 1-43
(1979); J. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining,46 UNiv. CmcAco L. REv. 3 (1978)
[hereinafter LANcBEIN].
SMITH, supra note 28, at 950; LANGBEIN, id, Langbein sees coercion in the threat of

increased punishment for defendants who insist on their right to trial. In his view,
"the plea agreement is the source of the coercion and already embodies the
involuntariness". LANOBEIN, id. at 16.
44

See generally, M. Halberstam, Towards Neutral Principles in the Administration of
Justice:A Critiqueof Supreme CourtDecisions Sanctioning the Plea BargainingProcess,
73(1) J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 1-49 (1982).

45

LAFAV, supra note 4, at 768.

6

See, e.g., D.W. Maynard, Defendant Attributes in Plea Bargaining:Notes on the Modeling
of Sentencing Decisions, 29(4) Soc. PRous. 347, 347-360 (1983).

47

ALSciiULER, 1968, supra note 29.

4

Cauacu, supra note 35, at 515.

4 S. Bibas, Plea BargainingOutside The Shadow of Trial, n7 HAv. L. REv. 2463 (2004).
o

Civnu,

supra note 35, at 515.

64

The Bargain has been Struck
In a plea bargain, no side is an absolute loser or winner. The practice can
accommodate the interests of both sides.?' It is beneficial to the accused insofar
as it helps him/her to avoid the cost, time, mental anxiety and other practical
burdens that a trial entails. Even if he/she is factually guilty and there is sufficient
evidence, the element of risk and uncertainty in a trial cannot be completely
eliminated. In many lesser offences, trial may actually be too costly and
embarrassing an option in light of the lenient sanctions that can be anticipated
following conviction. The state, on the other hand, can save on judicial and
prosecutorial resources,5 2 and perhaps be effective in achieving the object of
punishment by the promptness in punishment. Prosecutors also benefit from
plea bargaining as it enables them to secure high conviction rates while avoiding
the expense, uncertainty and opportunity costs of trials.53
Therefore, it is clear from the foregoing discussion that if not better, the
newly-introduced system of plea bargaining is no less rational or constitutional
than the trial process. As long as a system of plea bargaining that meets the
following four basic criteria suggested by Thomas Church, none of the charges
discussed in this chapter leveled against plea bargaining are applicable: () the
defendant always has the alternative of a trial at which both verdict and sentence
are determined solely on the merits; (2) the defendant is represented throughout
negotiations by a competent counsel; (3) both defence and prosecution have
equal access to relevant evidence; and (4) both sides possess sufficient resources
to take a case to trial.54 The direction for reform then should be to seek to achieve
these conditions rather than to question the reality that plea bargaining now is.
D. The Supreme Court's Views on Plea Bargaining
The Supreme Court of India has in the past quite vociferously expressed its
displeasure at the concept of plea bargaining.55 What is to be borne in mind in this
context is that all these occasions were before the provision for plea bargaining
was in place in our statute books, and also that the criticism seems to have been
based on a conception of plea bargaining different from what has currently found
place in the Cr.P.C.

supra note 28, at 950.
EASTERBROOK, supra note 3o, at 297.
5 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970).
5

SMITH,

52

54 CHURCH, supra

6

note 35, at 516-525.

Madanlal Ram Chandra Daga v. State of Maharashtra, A.LR. 1968 S.C. 1267;
Murlidhar Meghraj Loya v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1929; Ganeshmal
Jashraj v. State of Gujarat, A.LR. ig8o S.C. 264; Thippaswamy v. State of Karnataka,
A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 747; Kachhia Patel Shantilal Koderlal v. State of Gujarat, A.LR.
1980 S.C. 854; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Chandrika, A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 164.
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6
The case of MurlidharMeghraj Loya v. State of Maharashtra
6 is

illustrative. In this case, the appellants were being tried for selling adulterated
food within the meaning of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The
Supreme Court got the impression that the defendants pleaded guilty before the
trial magistrate pursuant to an informal, tripartite consensual arrangement
reminiscent of "plea-bargaining procedures in the United States of America",57
and speaking through Justice Krishna Iyer, expressed its anguish in the following
words:
To begin with, we are free to confess to a hunch that the appellants
had hastened with their pleas of guilty hopefully, induced by an
informal, tripartite understanding of light sentence in lieu of nolo
contendere58 stance. Many economic offenders resort to practices
the Americans call 'plea bargaining', 'plea negotiation', 'trading out'
and 'compromise in criminal cases' and the trial magistrate drowned
by a docket burden nods assent to the sub rosa anteroom settlement.
The businessman culprit, confronted by a sure prospect of the agony
and ignominy of tenancy of a prison cell, 'trades out' of the situation,
the bargain being a plea of guilt, coupled with a promise of 'no jail'...It
is idle to speculate on the virtue of negotiated settlements of criminal
cases, as obtains in the United States but in ourjurisdiction, especially
in the area of dangerous economic crimes and food offences, this
practice intrudes on society's interests by opposing society's decision
expressed through predetermined legislative fixation of minimum
sentences and by subtly subverting the mandate of the law59
A careful study of this judgment clearly brings out the context in which
these observations were made and the apprehensions of the court, apprehensions
which are to a great extent allayed by the procedure now incorporated into the
criminal code. First, the offence in question was an offence pertaining to food
adulteration which has potential public health effects. While the Criminal Law
(Amendment) Act, 2005 does carve out an exception for socio-economic
offences, there is some indication that the situation might have been different had
there been legal sanction for plea bargaining. Justice Krishna Iyer had observed:
66

Murlidhar Meghraj Loya v. State of Maharashtra, AJ.R. 1976 S.C. 1929 [hereinafter
Loya]

Loya, id. at 1933.
s8 A no/o contendere plea is the same as a guilty plea for the purposes of punishment,
but it is distinct in that it cannot be used against the accused as an admission of guilt
in subsequent cases. WHITEBREAD, supra note 5, at 407.
5 Loya, supra note 56, at 1933.
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We have no sanction, except surreptitious practice in some courts,
for 'trading out' of punitive severity although this aspect of the
criminal system deserves Indian jurists' consideration.
Secondly, in this case, the accused were charged with an offence punishable
with a minimum term of imprisonment of six months, and the trial court had
brazenly flouted this legislative mandate by sentencing the accused to a fine only.
Under the scheme introduced in 2oo5, if the Court finds that law provides for a
minimum punishment for the offence committed by the accused, it may sentence
the accused to half of such minimum punishment.6' Moreover, plea bargaining
does not always involve "no jail" as was observed by the Supreme Court;
observations like this seem to be based on misapprehensions.
The above holds true for subsequent rulings too. For instance, even in the
1999 judgment of State of Uttar Pradeshv. Chandrika,62 where the Supreme Court
set aside the order passed by the High Court allowing the plea bargain, the Court
supported its stance on the rationale that the concept of plea bargaining was not
recognised under our criminal justice system. The legal position now in 2007 is
obviously different with plea bargaining acquiring a place in the statute book.
This counters the next objection of the Supreme Court- articulated by the
court in Thippaswamy v. State of Karnataka<been that the procedure violates
Article 21 of the Constitution. This is obvious as at the time the practice was
adopted in the absence of any "procedure established by law" to sanction plea

bargaining.
Thus, the disapproval of plea bargaining by the Supreme Court in earlier
cases should be understood in the context in which the observations were madethat of something reminiscent of the American practice being adopted in India as
it is, without any authority of law- and restricted to the peculiar facts and
circumstances of the cases before the court. It is expected that post 2oo5, the
attitude of the apex judiciary would be more forthcoming and favourable.

IV. CONCLUSION
The aim of this paper has been to show that there is no inherent impropriety
in introduction of plea bargaining in a modified form in the Indian criminal justice
6u Id,
6'

62
61

at 1933.

§ 265E(c), Cr.P.C.
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system. Plea bargaining, as introduced in India, is not wrong in principle, or a
sacrifice of justice at the altar of administrative efficiency.
An appraisal of arguments from both sides suggests that plea bargaining is
a neutral process in the dispensation of criminal cases which should not erode the
deterrent effect of law and punishment, or beget due process concerns, or lead to
other unjust results. In fact, the plea bargaining system is one of mutual advantage.
Perhaps the primary advantage in the Indian context would be that it would help
clear the huge backlog of cases and in future allow prosecutors to pursue more
cases than would be otherwise possible. It would also help avoid much of the
bitter impact of a long period of detention has on undertrial prisoners. A manifest
consequence could perhaps also be that legal sanctions are applied to a lager base
of offenders, thus heightening the certainty of punishment, and adding to the
general deterrent effectiveness of legal sanctions. For the accused it means an
end to uncertainty, saving of trial-costs and avoiding the anxiety and other
practical burdens of a trial. It has been shown that the argument that plea
bargaining allegedly operates to encourage, if not coerce the accused to waive
their right to trial and the argument that societal interest in rational and
appropriates criminal sentences are misplaced because of the inherent
uncertainty in a trial and the mutuality of benefit that is associated with any plea
negotiation system.
It is concluded that any plea bargaining system in which both sides have
equal access to the same resources and which the plea is voluntarily and
intelligently made is constitutionally valid and does not violate the basic tenets of
criminal law. More specifically, the Indian scheme as contemplated by the
Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2005, appears to have taken note of the
traditional fears and objections associated with the process of plea bargaining.
The law makers have endeavoured to evolve an entirely new model of plea
negotiation which allays the fears and apprehensions of those opposed to the
concept of plea bargaining per se and which steers clear of the common pitfalls
the practice is susceptible to.
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